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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CLINT L. COLVIN, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20050869-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for communications fraud, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(2004); and from denial of his motion 
for new trial, in the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, Utah, the Honorable Glen 
R. Dawson presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2005). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue I: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for new 
trial? 
Standard of Review: Appellate courts "review the decision to grant or deny a motion 
for a new trial only for an abuse of discretion." State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11,^8, 994 P.2d 
1237. 
Issue II: Was the jury properly instructed as to "reasonable doubt?" 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's jury instructions under a 
correctness standard. "Whether [a jury] instruction correctly states the law is reviewable 
under a correction of error standard, with no particular deference given to the trial court's 
ruling." State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232,1244 (Utah 1993) (footnote omitted). "However, 
jury instructions to which a party failed to object at trial will not be reviewed absent a 
showing of manifest injustice." State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah App. 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following items are contained in Addendum A: 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 24 - Motion for New Trial 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with communications fraud. The State alleged that defendant 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly devised a scheme to defraud another or to obtain 
money by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material 
omissions, and, as a party to the offense, communicated with a person for the purpose of 
executing or concealing the scheme, and the value of the loss was or exceeded $5,000 (Rl). 
A jury found defendant guilty of communications fraud (R276). Defendant was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years in prison. The prison sentence was 
suspended upon certain conditions, including that defendant serve 180 days in the county jail 
(R357-62). Defendant filed a motion for a new trial (R363-68). The State filed a written 
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objection to the motion for new trial (R369-74). Following a hearing, the motion for new 
trial was denied (R406-07 and R422:138). Defendant timely appealed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Lumping Services. Anthony Bridenstein owned and operated Carrier Lumping 
Services ("CLS"), which contracted with Smith's to provide "lumping" services at one of its 
warehouses (R419:3,11). "Lumping" refers to loading or unloading products from semi 
trailers and arranging them on pallets for warehouse storage (R419:3-4). Smith's required 
CLS to unload all of its trailers, and independent truck companies delivering to the 
warehouse could also acquire CLS services for a fee (R419:21). 
In 2000, Bridenstein hired defendant as a "lumper" and soon promoted him to "dock 
lead/5 a position which made him responsible for collecting payments from truck drivers 
(R419:12). These payments were often made by cash or check, which the drivers generally 
left blank for dock leads to fill out (R420:154-55). As a result, anyone could have cashed 
such checks. Id. 
Bibles and receipt books. Dock leads were expected to make use of three business 
forms as they collected and deposited drivers' payments. First, initial forms referred to as 
"bibles" were used to keep track of the loads that arrived, and which truck was unloaded by 
whom (R419:21-22). Second, dock leads employed a consecutively numbered, triplicate 
receipt book to record payments from truckers (R419:24). One duplicate remained in the 
book, one went to management, and the third was given to the driver (R419:25-26). Each 
receipt book was assigned to a specific dock lead, who was expected to use only the book 
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issued to him (R419:84). At the end of each day, leads were required to fill out the third 
form, a deposit report, which was to be dropped, along with the day's payments and receipts, 
in a safe accessible to only two company officers (R419:22). 
A loophole in the system. In mid-2002, Bridenstein was forced to cut wages for all 
his employees on two occasions, and could sense that "somewhere in rny business structure 
. . . I was losing money." (R419:38, 43-44). As a result, he asked office manager Kristen 
Quisenberry to investigate the operation and discover the problem's source (R420:284). 
Quisenberry discovered that someone had been exploiting a "loophole" in the system. 
Receipt books, which contained fifty consecutively numbered receipts, and were 
consecutively numbered with other receipt books, were not issued by the general manager 
in numerical order (R420:127,194,283). Instead, he distributed them randomly. Id. Thus, 
although missing receipt numbers within a receipt book generally raised a "red flag" for 
Quisenberry, missing numbers between them did not (R420:194). As a result, unassigned 
receipt books could be used to collect payment from truck drivers, but the money collected 
could remain unreported without attracting a supervisor's attention (R420:l 13). Although 
this could have been detected by comparing daily receipts with that day's "bible", there was 
no such comparison procedure in place (R420:121, 205, 209). 
Upon inspection, Quisenberry discovered that there were a large number of "bible" 
entries without corresponding receipts (R420:120, 149-50, 288-89). She discovered that in 
only two months, over $5,000 was missing as a result of this loophole. (R420:307, 310). 
Defendant did not contest the amount of money missing (R420:307). 
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More than one receipt book. Daily "bibles" for defendant's d,c>ck were normally 
completed by defendant, although they would have been accessible to anyone passing 
through the dock (R419:29). The "bibles" exhibited at trial were found to be mostly filled 
by his handwriting (R419:29). Defendant had keyed access to the general manager' s office, 
where boxes of receipt books were stacked in a cardboard box under a desk (R 419:80, 
420:160, 195). Defendant testified that it would have been easy to exploit the loophole 
Quisenberry discovered, but denied doing so himself (R421:367). 
However, Smith's receiver Larry Huemiller, who was on duty during defendant's 
shift, testified that defendant frequenlK IIM.I1 moiv th.in one receipt book 
(R420:243, 246-47). His suspicions were triggered because using more than one receipt 
book was against normal lumping procedures, and Huemiller reported defendant's behavior 
to his supervisor (R420:244-46). Defendant's use of two receipt books while collecting 
payments "was a daily occurrence." (R420:247). 
Defendant testified at trial and denied involvement in any scheme to defraud, claiming 
that anyone could have accomplished the scheme (R420:196-98, 421:371). This included 
general manager Brandon Hamblin, who had recently been convicted of theft for cashing 
CLS checks in his own name (R421:372-73, 420, and R420:172). 
Defendant called a forensic accountant who testified that it would be very difficult to 
discover where money was leaving the system, much less trace the problem to an individual 
(R421:462, 473). Nevertheless, the jury found defendant guilty (R276). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant merely re-argues the same issues he raised in his motion for new trial. He 
has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new 
trial. The trial court properly determined that defendant had not received ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and he was therefore not entitled to a new trial. 
Defendant failed to object to the reasonable doubt jury instruction at trial, therefore 
the issue can only be reviewed for plain error or manifest injustice. Defendant is not entitled 
to relief because he cannot establish that the jury instruction given in his case constitutes 
manifest injustice. When taken as a whole, the jury instructions correctly communicated to 
the jury the principal of reasonable doubt. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
On appeal, defendant argues that his motion for new trial should have been granted 
because his trial counsel was ineffective in that he failed to folly investigate and call crucial 
witnesses, failed to obtain crucial discovery documents, and failed to argue for correct jury 
instructions.1 (def.'s br. at 6). Defendant also argues that the motion for new trial should 
have been granted based on cumulative error. Id. at 13. However, the court did not find that 
1
 This claim does not refer to the reasonable doubt jury instruction issue addressed 
below. Defendant did not raise any issue concerning the reasonable doubt jury instruction 
in his motion for new trial (R363-368). 
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trial counsel committed any errors, therefore, there could not have been any cumulative 
impact. 
4 Defendant cannot establish that he is entitled to relief 
merely by re-arguing the issues raised in his motion 
for new trial. 
On appeal, defendant has failed to argue that any of the trial court's factual findings 
were erroneous. He has also failed to establish that any of the trial court's legal 
determinations were not correct. On appeal, defendant simply re-argues the same issues 
previously raised in his motion for new trial. This fails to establish that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. Therefore, defendant tK 
relief. 
Appellate courts "review the decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial only 
for an abuse of discretion." State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, % 8, 994 P.2d 1237; see also State 
v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ }15,69 P.3d 1278 ("'[W]e will not reverse a trial court's decision 
[to grant or deny a new trial] absent a clear abuse of discretion'") (quoting State v. Harmon, 
956 P.2d 262,266 (Utah 1998)). "Any legal determinations made by the trial court as a basis 
for its denial of a new trial motion are reviewed for correctness." Loose, 2000 UT 11, U 8. 
The trial court's underlying findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. State v. Thomas, 
830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992). "[I]f a trial court has applied the correct legal standard, it 
has broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for a new trial." State v. Martin, 1999 
UT 72, Tf5, 984 P.2d 975 (citations omitted). 
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The trial court applied the correct legal standard under Strickland for establishing 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and found that defendant failed to meet either prong of the 
Strickland test. The court found that trial counsel's performance was not deficient 
(R422:137). In addition, the court found that nothing trial counsel did "was so prejudicial 
that it deprived Mr. Colvin of a fair trial." (R422:138). 
Defendant merely repeats the arguments that the trial court rejected, he offers no 
analysis why the court's rejection was an abuse of discretion. Defendant has failed to 
establish that the trial court's decision to deny the motion for new trial was a clear abuse of 
discretion. Therefore he is not entitled to appellate relief. 
B. The trial court properly denied the motion for new 
trial. 
The decision of the trial court to deny the motion for new trial was correct. Defendant 
bore the burden below of establishing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and 
was entitled to a new trial. See State v. Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547, 551 (1947) 
(defendant failed to establish his claim in support of his motion for new trial); State v. Boone, 
820 P.2d 930, 932 (Utah App. 1991); see generally State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 463 
(Utah 1989) ("The burden of showing error is on the party who seeks to upset the 
judgment"), overruled on other gnds by State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280 (Utah App. 1994). 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must meet the 
two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
He must establish that (1) his attorney's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient 
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performance prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The trial coi u; t determined that 
defendant had failed to meet the Strickland'test (R422:136). 
The trial court did not agree with defendant's allegation that he had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that defense counsel developed a trial 
strategy, and did an effective job of presenting that strategy to the jury. 
I must tell you from this vantage point, having sat through the trial and 
listening to the evidence today, my view is just otherwise. I believe, I believe 
[sic] and perceive and I will find that he developed a certain trial strategy. The 
strategy was to bring in an expert accountant who I thought did an excellent 
job testifying to basically show that the books and records of this business 
were so horribly kept that, that [sic] there's no way that the jury could find by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that you either committed the act or had mens 
rea, either one of those two things. Adopting that trial strategy I thought he did 
an effective job of presenting that to the jury, both through the testimony of the 
expert and through Mr. Colvin's own testimony. I thought at the time that it 
was - and I find today, I felt that it was a trial strategy that was effective. 
(R.422:136). 
Defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in tl lat lie failed to fi illy 
investigate and call crucial witnesses. At the evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial, 
a stipulation was entered that the produce dock lead, Casey Nielsen, would have testified that 
he gave all the money he collected to Mr. Hamblin (R422.T37). Defendant also named other 
employees who he claimed would have testified that they gave all of the funds they collected 
to Mr. Hamblin. However, none of these people testified at the evidentiary hearing 
(R422:137). 
Defendant's counsel conceded f these potential witnesses had been 
subpoenaed for trial, they might have appeared and exercised their Fifth AmendiruTil right 
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not to testify (R422:132). The question then would have been what the jury would infer from 
their refusal to testify. Id. 
The trial court determined that calling these other witnesses to testify might have 
shown "that there was rampant theft throughout the entire business as easily as it shows that 
one person was duping everybody in the business.'5 (R422:133). The trial court viewed this 
as a "two-edged sword." Id. In other words, calling these people to testify might have hurt 
defendant as much as it might have helped him. 
Defendant also argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain crucial 
discovery documents. Trial counsel had requested numerous documents, and had issued 
subpoenas for them (Rl 15-125). He had also served a notice of records deposition (Rl 13-
114). All of the requested documents were apparently not provided, because trial counsel 
filed a request for and affidavit in support of an order to show cause concerning these 
documents (R184-187).2 However, prior to trial, counsel made a strategic, tactical decision 
not to proceed with the order to show cause. A minute entry states that trial counsel 
requested a telephone conference and that he "will not pursue the OSC hearing for 
Wednesday." (R.241). 
Following the hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court noted that hearings 
had been held prior to trial in regard to the subpoenas (R422:137). However, the trial court 
2
 There is no evidence of exactly who or what counsel examined or investigated 
prior to trial, or why he did or did not examine or investigate certain things, because 
defendant made the decision not to call his trial counsel to testify at the hearing on the 
motion for new trial (R422:6). 
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pointed out that "there was a decision made and my view of it is that it was a trial strategy 
not to push forward with those subpoenas and I must perceive it was for the reasons we've 
discussed today, that is it creates a bit of a two-edged sword." Id. 
The trial court determined that trial counsel had made a legitimate, strategic, tactical 
decision not to push forward with the subpoenas to obtain certain documents. This was ;in 
appropriate strategic or tactical decision because the trial court recognized that the additional 
information would have been a "two-edged sword." In other words, there might have been 
additional helpfii! information, biit the information might also have been damaging to 
defendant's case and trial strategy. 
Defendant made the decision not to call trial counsel to testify at the hearing on the 
motion for new trial (R.422:6). Because defendant failed to establish why counsel decided 
not to pursue the doainnnf s, in id there is a reasonable explanation as to why he might not 
have pursued them, defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails. See State v. Litherland. 2 < n)() UT 
76, f^ 17, 12 P.3d 92 (Where the record appears inadequate, ambiguities or deficiencies will 
be construed in favor of finding that counsel performed effectively). 
A decision not to obtain potentially damaging information is a reasonable, strategic, 
tactical decision. "'[Strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the 
limitations on investigation.'" State v. Kooyman, 2006 UT App 222, \ 43, 112 P.3d 1252 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91, 104 Ivi 1. 2052 (1984) (other 
internal quotations omitted). 
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If counsel's "decision amounted to reasonable trial strategy or tactics, regardless of 
the outcome, counsel's decision will not qualify as ineffective assistance." Kooyman, 2005 
UT App 222 at TI43. "A lawyer's 'legitimate exercise of judgment' in the choice of trial 
strategy or tactics that did not produce the anticipated result does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel." State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Utah 1988) (quoting State 
v. McNicol 554 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1976). 
Defendant has identified no errors in the trial court's factual findings or its legal 
determinations. Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court erred in finding that trial 
counsel developed a certain trial strategy, and was not ineffective. Defendant has failed to 
establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. He is 
therefore not entitled to appellate relief. 
Defendant also argues that his trial counsel failed to present evidence supporting a 
reasonable alternative hypothesis that defendant lacked the mens rea necessary for this 
offense, and that he also failed to request jury instructions on this alternative theory of the 
case (def.'s br. at 12). Defendant argues in support of this theory, that his trial counsel failed 
to call Casey Nielsen and various other dock leads to testify at trial, and failed to obtain 
documents he had requested. Id. 
In commenting on this claim, the trial court noted that no other witnesses had been 
called to testify at the evidentiary hearing, and the court could not speculate as to what they 
would have said if they had been called. "But without evidence from them I don't think a 
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reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction would have been, would have been appropriate, 
especially given the elements instructions that we gave." (R422:137). 
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, counsel conceded that even if these 
witnesses had been called to testify at trial, they may have asserted their 5th amendment right 
not to testify (R422:132). In light of this, the trial court appropriately determined that it was 
not ineffective assistance of counsel to not attempt to present this alternative theory of the 
case, and therefore not to request jury instructions on the alternative theory. 
In addition, as addressed above, the trial court determined that trial counsel developed 
and presented a specific trial strategy (R422:136). It is not ineffective assistance r * 
to decide to use a certain strategy and present that defense, instead of presenting a different 
or alternative possible defense. 
Reviewing courts "give trial coiinsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions." They 
"will not question such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them." State 
v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996). In this case, there was a reasonable basis 
supporting trial counsel's decision to proceed with the trial strategy he chose. 
If counsel had chosen to attempt to present the alternative theory with evidence from 
the other witnesses defendant names, he faced three problems. First, it would have been a 
double edge-sword. Testimony from these witnesses might have helped, but also might have 
hurt defendant's case. Second, defendant's testimony at trial was that he did not in any way 
do anything to defraud Carrier Lumping Services (R421:325). The proposed alternative 
theory is apparently that defendant lacked the mens rea to commit the offense and was misled 
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by Brandon Hamblin (R422:11 -12). This alternative theory would have conflicted with the 
theory presented. Defendant would essentially be telling the jury, I didn't do it, but if I did 
do it, it was only because I was misled by Brandon Hamblin. Although defendants 
sometimes choose to present conflicting theories like this, it is certainly not ineffective 
assistance of counsel to decide that it was not in the defendant's best interest to present 
conflicting theories. Third, the witnesses might have chosen to assert their 5th Amendment 
right not to testify. If they had refused to testify, trial counsel would have been in the 
awkward position of having chosen a trial strategy that could not succeed. Therefore, trial 
counsel made a reasonable tactical decision to proceed with the trial strategy he chose -
which the trial court found was a reasonable strategic decision (R422:136). Therefore, the 
trial court found that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. 
"[A]n ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate 
tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 
468 (Utah App. 1993). Because reviewing courts "give trial counsel wide latitude in making 
tactical decisions . . . and because defense counsel's strategy was reasonable, Defendant has 
failed to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Bloomfield, 2003 Ut 
App 3,f31,63P.3dll0 (internal quotations omitted). Defendant has failed to establish that 
the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for new trial based on his claim 
that counsel was ineffective for not pursuing a possible alternative trial strategy. 
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II. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO APPELLAIE RELIEF 
BASED ON THE "REASONABLE DOUBT" JURY 
INSTRUCTION. 
A Defendant failed to object to the jury instruction at 
trial, therefore the instruction may not be assigned as 
error except to avoid a manifest injustice. 
Defendant alleges that the trial .court erred by giving a "reasonable cioi lbt" jury 
instruction which unconstitutionally lowered the state's burden of proof and incorrectly 
stated the law (def.'s br. at 13). Defendant acknowledges that he did not object to the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction at trial (def.'s br. at 13). 
Because defendant failed to object to the reasonable doubt ji lryinsti \ iction at trial,' the 
instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim 
P. 19(e) (West 2005). Taking guidance from rule 19(e), Utah's appellate courts "have been 
very reluctant to review jury instructions and other matters not preserved for appeal by means 
of an objection at trial." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d ill) 7, 1108-09 (Utah 1996); accord 
State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021,1023 (Utah 1987); State v. John, 770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 
1989). 
Defendant argues that based on State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33., 116 P.3d 305, the 
"reasonable doubt" jury instruction unconstitutionally lowered the State's biirden of proof, 
resulting in manifest injustice (def.'s br. at 14). Defendant concedes that the issue was not 
preserved at trial (def.'s br. at 13). However, he argues that the fact that the Reyes case was 
not decided until after his trial, constitutes an exceptional circumstance excusing his failure 
to preserve the claim (def.'s br. at 13-14). 
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Based on the invited error doctrine, if counsel does not object to a jury instruction, an 
appellate court will normally not review the instruction under the manifest injustice exception. 
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54, 70 P.3d 111. However, in the recent case of State v. 
Halls, 2006 UT App 142, P.3d , this Court acknowledged "an exception to the 
preservation rule for exceptional circumstances 'where a change in law or the settled 
interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial.9" Id. at f 13, FN 1 
(quoting State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah App. 1996). In Halls, this court reviewed a 
reasonable doubt jury instruction under the manifest injustice exception. The same reasoning 
would presumably apply in this case.3 Therefore, even though the claim was not preserved, 
3
 The State does not concede that Halls correctly decided that the exceptional 
circumstances exception to the preservation rule should apply in this situation. The 
exceptional circumstances exception is "ill-defined and applies primarily to rare 
procedural anomalies." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n. 3 (Utah 1993). 
In effect, defendant argues that he could not object at trial, because the basis for 
his objection did not yet exist. This argument was rejected by the supreme court in State 
v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994). Lopez was tried for sex crimes against a child. On 
appeal, he argued that a photo array was impermissibly suggestive under state due process 
principles announced in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Lopez, 886 P.2d at 
1113. At trial, Lopez had not objected on this ground, as Ramirez had not yet been 
decided. Id. On appeal, the supreme court had to "determine whether Lopez may now 
raise that issue on appeal." Id. The court held that "Lopez cannot raise the issue of state 
due process for the first time on appeal because he has not demonstrated that the 'plain 
error' or 'exceptional circumstances' exceptions exist." Id. 
The case at bar is indistinguishable. Nothing prevented defendant from challenging 
the reasonable doubt instruction even before Reyes was decided. In Reyes itself, the State 
argued that the Robertson three-part test was unconstitutional, despite the absence of any 
authority declaring it unconstitutional. Moreover, here, the court of appeals, in an 
opinion issued before defendant's conviction, described the Robertson three-part test as 
"constitutionally flawed" and "not consistent with United States Supreme Court 
precedent." See State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ^ 22, 30, 84 P.3d 841. Nothing 
prevented defendant from preserving his issue by making this argument at trial. 
Therefore, the exceptional circumstances exception should not apply. 
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it may be reviewed to determine whether the reasonable doubt jury instruction resulted in 
manifest injustice. 
B. Defendant's conviction should be affirmed because the 
State did not argue that it need only "obviate doubts 
that are sufficiently defined." 
On appeal, defendant argues that the reasonable doubt instruction given by the trial 
court unconstitutionally lowered the State's burden of proof, resulting in manifest injustice 
(def.'s br. at 14). Defendant argues that the language "obviates all reasonable doubt" 
erroneously and unjustly diminished the level of the State's burden of proof (def.'s br. at 14). 
He claims that this language constituted an error which the trial court could and should have 
remedied, that it prejudiced him and resulted in manifest injustice (def.'s br. at 14). 
In Reyes, 2005 UT 33, the Utah Supreme Court abandoned the three-part test 
concerning the reasonable doubt jury instruction previously applied in State v. Robertson, 932 
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997). It expressly abandoned the "obviate all reasonable doubt" language 
from Robertson. Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at \ 30. 
The reasonable doubt instruction given at trial in this case included the phrase 
"obviates all reasonable doubt." 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. You must keep in mind in 
assessing whether the State has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the burden never shifts to the defendant to call any witnesses, 
produce any evidence, or disprove any element of the crime charged. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. "Reasonable doubt" means a doubt that is based on reason and one 
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt 
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and not a doubt which is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on wholly 
speculative possibility. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies 
the mind, convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it and obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt 
is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise 
from the evidence or lack of evidence in this case. 
(R304). 
In Reyes, the court found the "'obviate all reasonable doubt' concept" "[i]nsightfiil and 
important," yet "linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect." Reyes, 2005 UT 33, \ 26. 
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also 
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof 
necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor [v. Nebraska, 511 
U.S. 1 (1994),] standard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step 
undertaking: the identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the 
doubt against the evidence. This process suggests a back and forth disputation 
of a doubt's merits, all to the end of determining whether the evidence is 
sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard 
does not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an 
ability either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. 
Id. at f 27. The court concluded, "[t]o the extent that the Robertson 'obviate' test would 
permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test 
works to improperly diminish the State's burden." Id. at \ 28. 
Reyes holds that the "obviate test" diminishes the State's constitutional burden of proof 
to the extent it would "permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are 
sufficiently defined." Id. "Essentially, the obviate test's 'substantial risk of causing a juror 
to find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt' comes from its 
potential to allow the State to argue that a juror must articulate and obviate specific doubts." 
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Halls, 2006 UT App. 142, \ at 17. Consequently, if the State does not argue that a "juror need 
articulate and eliminate specific doubts" the "obviate test" does not diminish the State's 
constitutional burden. Id. at \ 19. 
The potential due process danger identified in the Reyes opinion did not arise here. 
Defendant does not claim that the prosecutor argued that the State need obviate only those 
doubts that were "sufficiently defined." See def.'s br. at 10-14.4 On appeal, defendant has 
failed to establish that there was a "risk" that a juror could have found him guilty based on a 
degree of proof lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt." Therefore his claim fails. 
C. Defendant's conviction should also be affirmed 
because the jury instructions correctly conveyed the 
concept of reasonable doubt. 
The standard for assessing the validity of a reasonable doubt jury instruction is the 
"overarching principle" that "taken as a whole, the reasonable doubt jury instruction must 
correctly communicate the principle of reasonable doubt to the jury." Halls, 2006 UT App 
142 at \ 16 (quotations omitted). "[S]o long as the reasonable doubt instructions, 'taken as 
a whole, . . . correctly convey[ ] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury,5 they pass 
constitutional muster." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ^ 20, 530 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (quoting 
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22 (1994)). 
"Simply put, [the court] need only ask whether the instructions, taken as a whole, 
correctly communicate the principle of reasonable doubt, namely, that a defendant cannot be 
4
 Defendant has failed to include the prosecutor's closing argument as part of the 
record on appeal. 
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convicted of a crime 'except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 
to constitute the crime with which he is charged.'" Id at f 21 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 364 (1970)). 
The jury instructions here "pass constitutional muster" because, "taken as a whole," 
they "correctly convey[ed] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury." Cruz, 2005 UT 45 
at Tf 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This concept was conveyed not only 
by the reasonable doubt instruction quoted above, but also by others. 
The jury was told: "You are not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law, 
but must consider the instructions as a whole." (R293). The jury was also given other 
instructions concerning reasonable doubt. "[S]o long as the court instructs the jury on the 
necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt," no more is 
required. Victor, 511 U.S. at 5. The jury was correctly instructed that the defendant's guilt 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
If after an impartial consideration and comparison of all the evidence or 
the lack of evidence you can honestly say that you are not satisfied of the 
defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt. But if after such impartial 
consideration and comparison of all the evidence, you can truthfully say that 
you have an abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt, then you have no 
reasonable doubt. 
The law does not require demonstration of that degree of proof which, 
excluding all possibility of error, produces absolute certainty, for such degree 
of proof is rarely possible. Only that degree of proof is necessary which 
convinces the mind and directs and satisfies the conscience of those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon it. 
(R305). And see (R. 296 - "The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. This 
requires the state to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt."); (R297 -
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"Before you can convict the defendant . . . you must find from the evidence, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime:"); (R297 - "If, after careful 
consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every 
one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
guilty... If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you 
are not convinced of the truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty"); (R303 - "Our laws and 
Constitution require you to presume the innocence of a person accused of a crime. You must 
persevere in this presumption until the prosecutor has proved the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. So long as a reasonable doubt exists, you must find the defendant not 
guilty. This presumption of innocence is binding upon you and may not be disregarded by 
you, but may be overcome only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
Defendant has failed to establish that when the instructions are considered as a whole, 
there is any "reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions in a manner resulting 
in a finding of guilt based on a lesser standard than beyond a reasonable doubt" Reyes, 2005 
UT 33 at f 14 (citing Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 14-17, 21-22, 114 S.Ct 1239 (1994). 
The instructions given adequately conveyed the principle of reasonable doubt in light 
of United States Supreme Court and Utah Supreme Court cases holding that no particular 
form of words is required to instruct on reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Reyes, 2005 UT 33, and 
Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 ("[T]he Constitution does not require that any particular form of words 
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be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 
327, 346 (Utahl993) ("No talismanic phraseology is required"). 
Defendant is not entitled to appellate relief because when the jury instructions are 
considered as a whole, there is no "reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions 
in a manner resulting in a finding of guilt based on a lesser standard than beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at TJ14 (citing Victor, 511 U.S. at 14-17, 21-22). Defendant's 
conviction should be affirmed because when reviewed as a whole, the jury instructions given 
did not result in any manifest injustice. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
Tf 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Calif, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). In the case 
at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App. 
P. 29(a)(3). 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2% day of April, 2006. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
7^^^ Ar, 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorney General 
-23-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this . day of April, 2006,1 mailed, postage prepaid, two 
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Addendum A 
UT R RCRP Rule 24 Page 1 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 24 
c 
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
-•RULE 24. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new 
trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made not later than 10 days after imposition 
of sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix before expiration of 
the time for filing a motion for new trial. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either 
in evidence or in argument. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2005.] 
Rules Crim. Proc, Rule 24, UT R RCRP Rule 24 
Current with amendments received through October 1, 2005 
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